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Abstract
WiFi base stations are increasingly deployed in both public
spaces and private companies, and the increase in their
density poses a significant threat to the privacy of users.
Prior studies have shown that it is possible to infer the
social ties between users from their (co-)location traces
but they lack one important component: the comparison
of the inference accuracy between an internal attacker
(e.g., a curious application running on the device) and a
realistic external eavesdropper (e.g., a network of sniffing
stations) in the same field trial. We experimentally show
that such an eavesdropper can infer the type of social ties
between mobile users better than an internal attacker.
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Introduction
Upcoming device-to-device communication technologies
(such as WiFi Direct, Nokia Instant Community (NIC)
and Qualcomm’s AllJoin) will enable opportunistic and
localized interactions among physically co-located devices.
Already today, Apple’s AirDrop allows device-to-device
exchange of data through the WiFi and there are
numerous games that use Bluetooth for multiplayer.
The information that can be inferred only by observing
the data exchange and users’ (co-)location traces is very
sensitive, in particular social ties [1]. Several studies have
shown that (co-)location traces alone reveal the existence
and type of social ties among people [2]. Most of the
existing works are based on a single source of information:
either proximity logs stored on the mobile devices or
WiFi/cellular data obtained from the network operators.
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Figure 2: Map of the deployed
wireless network of 37 APs
controlled by the adversary.
We address the problem of social ties inference by
conducting a comparative analysis in a peer-to-peer
wireless network deployed on the EPFL university campus.
We collected communication information from 80
participants carrying smartphones during a four-month
experiment. We gathered data from both the
smartphones and from the WiFi sniffing network,
comprised of a set of access points (APs) passively
intercepting communications between the participants.
This data-source diversity reflects the information that
can be gathered by (i) a curious application running on a
device and (ii) a network infrastructure owner which seeks
to infer the social ties between its employees or a network
of compromised (community) hotspots. We use an
inference framework to evaluate the accuracy of the
inference of social ties. Our evaluation provides empirical
evidence about the difference between the adversary’s
accuracy and that of a curious application.
Experimental Setup and Data
In addition to the network deployment and the field trial,
the participants also answered survey questionnaires to
construct, together with academic records, the ground
truth of social ties.
Each participant was identified by a fixed random ID
assigned at the beginning of the trial. The devices
periodically sent beacon messages and ran background
services that collected, at regular intervals, information
including the list of neighbors’ MAC addresses. Whenever
a participant’s device connected to the Internet, the logs
were uploaded on a centralized database.
We implemented a practical adversary who monitored a
fixed area by using a limited number of wireless sniffing
stations. Specifically, the adversary had access to a
deployed wireless mesh network of 37 WiFi APs (Asus
WL-500gP running OpenWRT Linux) in a specific region
of the campus (Figure ). Each AP passively eavesdropped
on the P2P packets generated by the participants’
smartphones.Note that this external adversary did not
have access to any information stored on the mobile
devices, and that at no time did the participants connect
to the Internet through the adversarial APs. Because
application-layer encryption was sometimes used, we
assume that the adversary did not have access to the
content of the messages.
Summary. In our experimental data, we have: (i) the
internal data, constituted by local logs collected by the
mobile devices and containing encounter data (list of
neighbors’ MAC addresses, the timestamps and the RSSI
values of received packets), and (ii) the adversarial data,
containing the headers of the sniffed packets (sent by the
mobile devices), which include the timestamps and RSSI
values of received packets at the sniffing APs, as well as
the device ID of the sender. We considered three classes
of social ties: (i) friends, (ii) classmates and (iii) others
(people can be simultaneously classmates and friends). To
construct the ground truth data, each relationship is
assigned one (or more) class labels based on (i) the
participants’ answers to the survey questionnaires (for
friends) and (ii) the database of academic course
registration provided by the university (for classmates).
We considered asymmetric social ties as symmetric
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Figure 3: Partition of the map in
pathways, public spaces and
classrooms.
because of the subjective nature of the friendship
relationship that could be perceived by only one of the
two persons. We observed that 25% of all the 3,160
possible relationships were tagged as classmates and 2%
as friends. We tagged the remaining as others.
Social Ties Inference Framework
We developed an inference framework to evaluate the
accuracy of the attacker’s reconstruction of users’ ties.
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Figure 4: Experimental
distributions and fitted pdfs from
the adversarial data.
A relationship is defined by a set of encounters: we define
an encounter between any two users as a continuous time
interval that meets a threshold, both on its duration and
on the proximity of the two involved users. The proximity
between users is computed in two ways, depending on the
data source. From the internal device logs, we use the
RSSI values of messages exchanged between users in order
to determine their distance, whereas from the adversarial
sniffed data, the proximity is determined by computing the
distance between the estimated location coordinates of
each user, based on device-to-AP RSSI values.
A number of features are extracted from the
internal/adversarial logs, at the granularity of an
encounter or of a relationship, and fed to the classifier
(Figure 5). Typical discriminating features include
encounter duration, the proximity of users during
encounters, inter-encounter time, and the number and
periodicity of encounters [3].
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Figure 5: Overview of the inference framework.
In our context, the location where encounters take place is
a key feature of relationships. This information is only
available in the adversarial data and is computed from the
users’ locations estimated by the adversary. More
specifically, we partitioned the region of the experiment
covered by the adversarial network into three different
areas (Figure 3).
Summary. At the granularity of an encounter, we extract:
(i) the encounter duration (the time elapsed between
the first and last message exchanged during the
encounter), (ii) the inter-encounter time (the time
elapsed since the end of the previous encounter and the
beginning of the current encounter), and (iii) the
encounter RSSI value (the average of the RSSI values of
the messages exchanged during the encounter).
For the adversarial data, we further consider (iv) the
encounter location, characterized by the fraction of the
encounter time spent in each type of location (Figure 3).
At the granularity of a relationship, we consider an
additional feature: the total number of encounters over
the trial. Figure 4 depicts the experimental histograms of
one feature in our dataset.
Results
The performance of the classifier (Figure 6) is evaluated
in terms of its true positive rate (TPR) and false positive
rate (FPR).
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Figure 6: Accuracy of the external adversary in inferring social
ties for different distance thresholds among devices (used in
the encounter detection). The horizontal lines correspond to
the internal data.
Using Internal Proximity Data. Using only 30% of data
samples for training, we observe the best TPR (84%) and
a moderate FPR (27%) for friends, which means that the
actual proximity data and the encounter features we
selected are quite discriminating for this class. The actual
proximity data works well for the friends and classmates
ties inference, whereas it has a more limited success for
other types of ties. This is not surprising, as proximity
information, without taking into account the actual
location of the interaction, is intuitively tied to inferring
close and periodic interactions.
Using Adversarial (Estimated) Proximity Data. At a
lower encounter-distance threshold (5-10 meters), the
adversary has a very high TPR rate for classmates and
friends (79% and 74% respectively) while it suffers from
an elevated FPR as well (53% for friends). The accuracy
for others is relatively low at 28%, meaning that the
prediction suffers from a significant number of false
positives for friends and classmates. For larger thresholds
(20-40 meters), the accuracy for others doubles and is
consistently larger than for the friends.
Internal vs. Adversarial For high distance thresholds
(20-40 meters), the success in inferring friendships from
external data decreases by at least 50% compared to the
case where internal data is used. Meanwhile, there is a
two-fold increase in TPR for the others category. Overall,
we observe that the increase of the encounter-distance
threshold for the adversary is highly beneficial for the
detection of non-friendships. By adjusting the threshold
based on the target relationship class, the external
adversary obtains an inference performance comparable to
that of the internal adversary who uses the actual
proximity information available on the devices.
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